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THE DEBT PARADOX: IN DEBT BUT SOCIETY OWES 
YOU A DEBT 
AN EXONEREE’S PATH TO HOLISTIC RELIEF THROUGH THE 
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
ABSTRACT 
What do the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system have in 
common? Both aim to provide fresh starts to those who have moved through 
them. The bankruptcy system does so by rewarding honest but unfortunate 
debtors with discharge from debt. The criminal legal system attempts to provide 
a fresh start through reentry programs to those exiting prison. Yet neither system 
successfully ensures a blank slate, which is in part due to the history of racial 
bias in both systems. A limited subset of debtors benefits from the bankruptcy 
system, while the criminal legal system makes reentry very difficult for convicted 
felons. The wrongfully convicted are also not provided the necessary tools to 
obtain a fresh start as they reenter society. With restricted access to reentry 
programs, further injury due to barriers they face upon reentry, and debt 
stemming from their wrongful conviction, exonerees require a more holistic 
approach to ensure that they have a fresh start. The bankruptcy system offers an 
opportunity to meaningfully improve reentry for the wrongfully convicted. 
This Comment proposes that exonerees should be entitled to an expedited 
chapter 13 discharge of the debt stemming from their wrongful conviction. 
Further, this Comment argues that states should provide more holistic reentry 
programs that include access to bankruptcy attorney services. Discharging this 
debt would relieve exonerees and their families of some of the misfortune caused 
by wrongful conviction. By doing so, the bankruptcy system would promote its 
goal of providing a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States bankruptcy system has long recognized two central aims: 
(1) providing a fresh start to debtors who are unable to pay their debt; while (2) 
recognizing the interests of creditors by maximizing total return through an 
efficient process.1 The goal of providing a fresh start can also be found in the 
criminal legal system through programs that strive to support individuals as they 
reenter society after being released from prison. Yet the mechanisms in place to 
help ensure these fresh starts—the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
and reentry programs in the criminal legal system—have elicited extensive 
criticism.  
The fresh starts offered by the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal 
system have been limited by each system’s history of racial bias. In the 
bankruptcy system, this is evident in the racial disparity between groups that 
have benefited most from the Code.2 The complexity of the bankruptcy system 
also presents a huge challenge for pro se debtors, leaving unanswered the 
question of how many debtors choose not to file for bankruptcy due to the 
inaccessibility of the courts.3  
The criminal legal system has an overt history of systemic racism, which is 
clear at every stage of the criminal legal process.4 The United States incarcerates 
the highest population of any country in the word, which was fueled by the “war 
on drugs” and the “tough on crime” approach to criminal reform.5 The prison 
population doubled between 1980 and 1988, with communities of color being 
incarcerated at a staggeringly high rate.6 While these numbers have decreased 
by 34% since 2006, Black Americans are still disproportionately imprisoned.7 
At the end of 2018, Black Americans represented 33% of the prison population, 
 
 1 See In re Selinsky, 365 B.R. 260, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Bankruptcy is an equitable process. It 
is a process for debtors to get a fresh start. The goal of every bankruptcy case should be a discharge of debts and 
maximizing value for creditors.”). 
 2 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 623, 638–39 
(2012). 
 3 See id. at 630–31; Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1115, 1115 
(2016). 
 4 United States Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/US.html (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2020); James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass-incarceration.  
 5 Id.  
 6 Cullen, supra note 4.  
 7 John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. has Fallen by a Third Since 2006, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-
prison-2018-vs-2006/.  
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although Black Americans make up only 12% of the United States population.8 
Black people are stopped more frequently on the street by police, have a higher 
likelihood of being subjected to the use of force, and are more likely to be 
arrested and to be arrested repeatedly in the same year.9 Further, as the 
population of incarcerated Black Americans has decreased, these individuals 
leave prison with inadequate assistance to reenter society, as they face barriers 
with health, housing, and employment that stem from their status as convicted 
felons.10 Thus, racial disparities within the criminal legal system are also 
pervasive in reentry systems. 
Unsurprisingly, a system with such bias has led to a staggering number of 
wrongful convictions.11 Exonerees, however, are often denied access to 
traditional reentry programs. The bankruptcy system provides an opportunity to 
assist exonerees as they reenter society. Many argue that exonerees should be 
compensated for the injuries they have suffered due to their wrongful conviction; 
“[t]he state whose actions have put individuals in prison for crimes they did not 
commit owes a debt to those who through no fault of their own have lost years 
and opportunity. The debt should be recognized and paid.”12 Yet who bears the 
burden of repaying the debt that society owes to the wrongfully convicted? This 
remains an open question. Some jurisdictions provide compensation to 
exonerees, but this system is unreliable and often inadequate.13 Even when the 
exonerees have been compensated, the compensation schemes do not take into 
account all of the challenges they face when reentering society.14  
For example, although mechanisms exist to compensate exonerees for the 
pain, trauma, and lost earning potential they suffered by being imprisoned for 
crimes they did not commit, exonerees and their families, on their own, must 
 
 8 Id.  
 9 Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(July 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/07/27/disparities/.  
 10 ADIAH PRICE-TUCKER ET AL., SUCCESSFUL REENTRY: A COMMUNITY-LEVEL ANALYSIS 19–20 (2019), 
https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/sources/program/IOP_Policy_Program_2019_Reentry_Policy.pdf.  
 11 See Wrongful Convictions, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/issues/wrongful-convictions/ (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2020) (“Thousands of people have been wrongly convicted across the country in a system defined 
by official indifference to innocence and error.”). 
 12 Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 73, 74 (1999); see generally EDWIN BORCHARD & E. RUSSELL LUTZ, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: 
ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) (arguing wrongfully convicted should be compensated similarly to tort 
victims for the public wrongs they have endured). 
 13 See Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject. 
org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (contrasting state compensation statutes). 
 14 Shawn Armbrust, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 160 (2004) (“[C]ompensation can be structured to best remedy the very 
real physiological, psychological, and financial issues facing them upon their release.”). 
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handle the debt that resulted from their wrongful conviction. Sources of such 
debt include court fees and fines, attorney fees, restitution payments, child 
support, taxes, increased debt and default created by the inability to make 
payments and pay bills while in prison, and barriers to obtaining employment 
after release from prison. Addressing this debt would provide a more holistic 
approach to reentry for exonerees. 
Perhaps the most powerful mechanism within the Code is the discharge from 
debt, which provides freedom from personal liability of previous debts. The 
bankruptcy system could help supplement this holistic approach by providing an 
expedited discharge of the debt that stemmed from an exoneree’s wrongful 
conviction. The hardship discharge of chapter 13 of the Code is explicitly 
reserved for the “honest but unfortunate debtor” and must be filed in good 
faith.15 The hardship discharge gives relief to a debtor when: (1) the debtor is 
unable to complete plan payments “due to circumstances for which the debtor 
should not justly be held accountable”; (2) the value of the property distributed 
under the plan must not be less than the value distributed under a hypothetical 
chapter 7 liquidation; and (3) modification of the plan is “not practicable.”16 The 
debtor who receives the hardship discharge can reenter the economy without the 
former burden of debt.  
The wrongfully convicted should satisfy these requirements. First, exonerees 
are victims of circumstances that are beyond their control and are the epitome of 
“honest but unfortunate” people, as they have served time and lost years of 
freedom due to a failure of the criminal legal system.17 Wrongful conviction is 
tragic; “[a]mong the most shocking of . . . injuries and most glaring of injustices 
are erroneous criminal convictions of innocent people.”18 Second, because it is 
unlikely that an exoneree’s bankruptcy estate will contain property of high value, 
creditors would be unlikely to receive more value under the liquidation 
provisions of chapter 7. Third, due to the many challenges that the wrongfully 
 
 15 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2019). The Supreme Court has also recognized this principle:  
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as 
well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for 
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and 
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing 
debt. 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citations omitted).  
 16 Alan M. Ahart, Whether to Grant a Hardship Discharge in Chapter 13, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 559, 562–
63 (2013). 
 17 Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244 (1934) (citations omitted). 
 18 BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12.  
SELDEN_12.16.20 12/16/2020 2:14 PM 
2020] THE DEBT PARADOX 99 
convicted face, modifying the plan would not be practicable. Thus, an exoneree 
should meet the requirements of the hardship discharge. 
Allowing expedited hardship discharges to exonerees under chapter 13 
would align with the long-purported mission of the bankruptcy system: to 
provide a fresh start to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” Moreover, if reentry 
programs provided access to bankruptcy attorneys, some of the financial burdens 
of the wrongfully convicted could be alleviated. By helping exonerees 
reintegrate into the economy, the bankruptcy system could supplement holistic 
approaches to reentry. In doing so, society could begin to relieve the enormous 
debt that is owed to the victims of wrongful conviction.  
Part I of this Comment examines wrongful conviction and the need for a 
more robust approach to the financial component of reentry. It does so by 
providing a background on the history of wrongful conviction in the United 
States, exploring how reentry systems currently function, and discussing how an 
exoneree and his family members might accumulate debt while in prison and 
upon release. Part II scrutinizes the existing financial mechanisms that are 
available to compensate the wrongfully convicted in other areas of law. Part III 
then turns to the bankruptcy system. After first providing a primer on how the 
bankruptcy system functions, it delves into the requirements of the chapter 13 
hardship discharge. Finally, Part IV proposes how to incorporate relief for 
exonerees into the bankruptcy system. It examines the benefits of discharging 
the debts of exonerees, considering both the benefit to the exoneree and the 
bankruptcy system. Part IV also responds to the implications and potential 
criticisms of granting exonerees hardship discharges.  
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
This Section explores the history of wrongful conviction, examining both 
the past studies of wrongful conviction and the potential causes of wrongful 
conviction. Next, it considers the current landscape of reentry programs, the 
exclusion of exonerees from these programs, and the limited number of reentry 
programs that are available to exonerees. It concludes by considering the debt 
exonerees accumulate as a result of their wrongful conviction. 
A. Background Facts on Wrongful Conviction 
To fully understand the complexity and necessity of providing meaningful 
and holistic assistance to exonerees, it is important to first understand the 
backdrop of this issue. Determining the causes of wrongful convictions is 
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complex, and thus determining who bears the burden of remedying the effects 
of wrongful conviction is complicated. “[A] mistake has been made, whether in 
good faith or bad, and the question arises, who should bear the loss, the hapless 
victim alone or the community.”19 This complexity, however, does not relieve 
society of determining an effective way to aid those most significantly impacted 
by wrongful conviction.20 
The United States criminal legal system has a history of wrongful 
conviction, which has long been studied.21 Yet these studies have not necessarily 
led to a system that helps remedy the wrongs that stem from wrongful 
conviction. In 1932, Edwin Borchard suggested:  
[I]t seems strange that so little attention has been given to one of the 
most flagrant of all publicly imposed wrongs—the plight of the 
innocent victim of unjust conviction in criminal cases. Perhaps the 
indifference is attributable to the belief that such occurrences are too 
rare to justify public concern.22  
Since Borchard made these remarks, the number of exonerations has 
dramatically increased as society’s ability to identify wrongful conviction has 
increased. 
The number of exonerations has risen as DNA testing has been refined, 
making the issue of wrongful conviction impossible to ignore.23 Of the 2,678 
exonerations that have occurred in the United States since 1989, 1,465 (54.7%) 
of those exonerations have occurred in this decade.24 Likewise, the research into 
the causes of wrongful conviction, and the recognition of the complexity of these 
causes, has increased.25 Wrongful convictions result from a “confluence of 
 
 19 BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12, at 376–77.  
 20 See Meggan Smith, Have We Abandoned the Innocent? Society’s Debt to the Wrongly Convicted, 2 
CRIM. L. BRIEF 3, 12 (2006) (“The fact that it is impossible to fully compensate an individual for the loss of 
years of his freedom does not absolve society of its duty to rectify the injustice inflicted on exonerees to the 
extent feasible.”). 
 21 See, e.g., BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12 (conducting a survey of sixty-five cases of wrongful 
conviction in 1932 in an effort to refute the misconception that wrongful convictions never happen or are a 
“physical impossibility.”). 
 22 BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12. 
 23 Armbrust, supra note 14, at 181. 
 24 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).  
 25 Professor Findley and Professor Scott have performed groundbreaking work in this area, finding:  
Literally hundreds of additional exonerations in the last fifteen years alone have been based on 
evidence other than DNA . . . These exonerations have challenged the traditional assumption that 
the criminal justice system does all it can to accurately determine guilt, and that erroneous 
conviction of the innocent is, as the Supreme Court has assumed, ‘extremely rare.’ Further, they 
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factors,” making it difficult to identify an exclusively responsible party.26 Racial 
bias is pervasive in wrongful conviction, reflecting the systemic racism that fuels 
our criminal legal system.27 Additional contributing factors include eyewitness 
misidentification, false confessions, forensic science error or fraud, 
governmental misconduct, or inadequate defense counsel.28 “Tunnel vision” can 
also lead prosecutors and investigators to become so focused on one theory of 
the case that they might, consciously or unconsciously, begin to ignore evidence 
that points to another theory of the case.29 Yet scholars have suggested that “a 
canonical list of factors” is limiting and might create “a stagnation” that slows 
“needed action to improve justice processes that generate inaccurate verdicts.”30  
Wrongful convictions wreak havoc on everyone: the exonerees, the victims 
of the crimes for which the exonerees were convicted, the families of the victims, 
the families of the wrongfully convicted, and society at large.31 The longest 
 
have opened a window for scholarly and institutional inquiry into the causes of wrongful 
convictions and the reforms that might prevent such miscarriages of justice in the future. 
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 291, 291–92 (2006). 
 26 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, The Confluence of Factors Doctrine: A Holistic Approach to Wrongful 
Convictions, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 369, 370 (2018) (citation omitted).  
 27 See, e.g., Race and Wrongful Conviction, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf (showing “innocent 
black people are about seven times more likely to be convicted of murder than innocent white people”, a black 
person serving time for sexual assault is three-and-a-half times more likely to be innocent than a white person, 
and an innocent black person are about twelve times more likely to be convicted of a drug crime than a white 
person.). See generally Harvey Gee, Eyewitness Testimony and Cross-Racial Identification, 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 835, 838–39 (2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996)). 
 28 Hartung, supra note 26, at 370–71. 
 29 Professor Findley and Professor Scott’s research indicates that this effect can extend beyond just the 
prosecutors:  
This process leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike to focus on a 
particular conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that 
conclusion. Through that filter, all information supporting the adopted conclusion is elevated in 
significance, viewed as consistent with the other evidence, and deemed relevant and probative. 
Evidence inconsistent with the chosen theory is easily overlooked or dismissed as irrelevant, 
incredible, or unreliable. 
Findley & Scott, supra note 25, at 292. 
 30 Marvin Zalman & Matthew Larson, Elephants in the Station House: Serial Crimes, Wrongful 
Convictions, and Expanding Wrongful Conviction Analysis to Include Police Investigation, 79 ALB. L. REV. 941, 
946, 952 (2015) (quoting Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186 
(2008)). 
 31 Wrongful conviction not only has a drastic effect on those who are wrongfully convicted, but also 
seriously affects the victims of the crimes for which the exonerees were convicted. SERI IRAZOLA ET AL., STUDY 
OF VICTIM EXPERIENCES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION, at iii (2013); Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One 
Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions after a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 
836 (2010). 
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reported amount of time spent wrongfully incarcerated is forty-five years.32 The 
National Registry of Exonerations estimates that exonerees have lost a total of 
24,167 years as a result of wrongful incarceration.33 This lapse of time represents 
time spent away from families, time that could have been spent as a productive 
member of society, and time that a crime victim thought his or her attacker was 
imprisoned. Additionally, studies indicate that incarceration can have a drastic 
effect on one’s life expectancy.34 On a larger scale, mass incarceration has 
stunted the average life expectancy in the United States as compared to other 
developed countries.35  
Time in prison affects every aspect of one’s life. A wrongfully convicted 
person’s struggle is not remedied solely by the fact that he has been exonerated. 
At a minimum, society should provide meaningful assistance to exonerees once 
they reenter society.  
B. Current Reentry Programs 
After exonerees are released from prison, the failure of the criminal legal 
system continues to disrupt their lives. This disruption is immediately evident, 
as exonerees often do not have access to the already lackluster reentry programs 
available to people exiting prison. Many jurisdictions attempt to provide former 
offenders with a fresh start through the aid of various reentry programs, with the 
aim of deterring crime and reducing recidivism.36 Reentry programs were 
developed to create a bridge between leaving prison and reentering society.37 
 
 32 Richard Phillips was wrongfully convicted of murder in 1972 at twenty-five years old. He was seventy-
one years old when his conviction was vacated, and he was released from prison in 2017. Case Description: 
Richard Phillips, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
browse.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
 33 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
 34 Emily Widra, Incarceration Shortens Life Expectancy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy/.  
 35 Id. 
 36 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf; 
Reentry Services Directory, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/reentry-services-
directory/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).  
 37 Professor Jonson and Professor Cullen have discussed reentry programs as part of the larger movement 
to facilitate a successful transition from prison to society:  
A key feature of the reentry movement is its focus on developing programs to facilitate the 
successful return of prisoners to the community. This emphasis is important because it ties reentry 
to the rehabilitative ideal. Implicit in the very idea of programming—whether conducted inside 
or outside the prison—is that offenders face personal and situational risks that, if left unaddressed, 
will likely lead them back into crime. Reentering prisoners are thus seen as being at risk for 
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These programs can be court-mandated or can be sought by the individual in 
need of services.38 Reentry programs attempt to aid formerly incarcerated 
individuals by helping them secure employment, find housing, and gain access 
to educational tools that will help them succeed upon reentry.39 Yet reentry 
programs are far from successful because the transition from prison to society 
presents challenging barriers.40 In response to the high rate of recidivism, critics 
are calling for reentry programs to provide meaningful assistance by “tailor[ing] 
their services in order to address the unique needs of the populations they 
serve.”41 
To make matters worse, exonerees are not always able to receive assistance 
from reentry programs. Many of these programs are available to parolees, but 
because exonerees are not parolees, they do not qualify for these programs.42 
Thus, most exonerees are left without any guaranteed assistance during their 
reentry to society. And while parolees and exonerees share many reentry needs, 
exonerees have an additional set of needs that stem directly from their wrongful 
incarceration.43 Just as reentry needs vary amongst parolees, reentry needs vary 
amongst exonerees. These needs depend on factors such as whether the person 
was exonerated before or after their release from prison, the length of wrongful 
incarceration, whether the exoneree has support from family and friends, and 
concerns regarding health and financial status.44 Thus, exonerees face numerous 
obstacles to reentering the society from which they were wrongfully removed, 
and these obstacles must be addressed on an individual basis.45  
 
recidivating—but not destined to this fate. The challenge is thus to develop programs that work—
which are effective and evidence based. 
Cheryl Lero Jonson & Francis T. Cullen, Prisoner Reentry Programs, 44 CRIME & JUST. 517, 522 (2015). 
 38 Jeremiah Mosteller, What Makes a Reentry Program Successful?, CHARLES KOCH INST. 
https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-policing-reform/reentry-programs/ (last visited Sept. 
5, 2020).  
 39 Id.  
 40 Jonson & Cullen, supra note 37, at 529; Gerald P. Lopez, How Mainstream Reformers Design 
Ambitious Reentry Programs Doomed to Fail and Destined to Reinforce Targeted Mass Incarceration and 
Social Control, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 62 (2014). 
 41 PRICE-TUCKER ET AL., supra note 10, at 3; Jonson & Cullen, supra note 37, at 517.  
 42 The Problem, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.after-innocence.org/the-problem (last visited Oct. 23, 
2019); see Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for Exonerees, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 245, 248 (2017). 
 43 See Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for the Wrongly 
Convicted, 82 MO. L. REV. 369, 373 (2017).  
 44 See id.  
 45 Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (“The punishment continues after incarceration 
. . . [w]ith no money, housing, transportation, health services or insurance, and a criminal record that is rarely 
cleared despite innocence, the punishment lingers long after innocence has been proven. States have a 
responsibility to restore the lives of the wrongfully convicted. . . .”). 
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Many steps are required to fulfill these goals and to successfully help an 
exoneree after he is released from prison. The Innocence Network provides an 
Exoneration Checklist, which demonstrates a number of the complicated but 
necessary steps to aid an exoneree before and after their release.46 This list, 
however, is only a starting point. For example, it does not address instances 
where debt accumulated while an exoneree was in prison. 
In addition to the minority of states that provide reentry assistance to 
exonerees through statutory schemes,47 certain non-profit groups operate reentry 
programs to aid the wrongfully convicted.48 For example, the Innocence Project 
has a social work department that begins working with exonerees before they 
are released from prison.49 This program acknowledges the vast array of services 
needed for exonerees by “locating birth certificates and social security 
numbers[,] finding family members, securing housing or arranging for critical 
medical and psychological treatment.”50 While such programs provide services 
to some exonerees, there are still many exonerees left without assistance. 
By failing to provide holistic reentry services to the wrongfully convicted, 
society perpetuates the error and harm that has already been inflicted on 
exonerees. To provide exonerees with a fresh start to a life that was derailed by 
the failure of the criminal legal system, a more holistic and individualized 
approach to reentry should be taken and provided to all exonerees. One aspect 
of that holistic approach could be to coordinate access to bankruptcy attorneys, 
who would consider and address the debt that results from wrongful conviction.  
 
 46 Prior to release from prison or exoneration, the list recommends: (1) assess the exoneree’s social 
support and living situation by determining what he wants to do, where he wants to live, and what contacts can 
be made to support him; (2) locate and obtain the exoneree’s personal documentation, including, if available, his 
prison ID, Social Security Card, birth certificate, State ID or driver’s license, and documentation of Veteran 
status. If these items are not available, help the client and his family members apply for them; and (3) assess the 
client’s health needs, including physical health, mental health, and determining any necessary medication or 
significant physical or mental health history. Exoneration Checklist, INNOCENCE NETWORK, https:// 
innocencenetwork.org/exoneration-checklist/, (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). Following release or exoneration, the 
list recommends: (1) contacting continuing contact with any available support network; determining what public 
benefits the exoneree is eligible for, including food stamps, cash assistance, Medicaid, Veterans Benefits, or 
Supplemental Security Insurance; and (3) assessing what legal assistance the client needs. Id.  
 47 See infra Section II(A). 
 48 See, e.g., About Section, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.after-innocence.org/aboutai (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2020) (providing “efficient re-entry assistance for America’s wrongfully convicted, and advocates with 
exonerees for laws that provide them with meaningful compensation and effective re-entry support.”). 
 49 Support the Exonerated, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/Support/ (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2020). 
 50 Id.  
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C. Measuring an Exoneree’s Debt 
There are many reasons why an exoneree might be in debt upon release from 
prison, including: lost income and work experience, domestic support 
obligations, education costs, family expenses, legal fees, court fees and fines, 
taxes, and barriers to obtaining employment after release from prison. These 
factors should not only be considered for the exoneree as an individual but also 
with respect to his family members. These potential debts are discussed in this 
Section. 
1. Debt Due to Time in Prison 
It is common for incarcerated individuals to accrue debt while serving time. 
The exoneree would not have had the opportunity to gain meaningful income 
while wrongfully incarcerated due to the nature of wages paid to those working 
a prison job. Further, he lost the opportunity to pay off the debt that may have 
accumulated prior to incarceration. Wages for employment in prisons are 
woefully below the minimum wage outside of prison and are typically capped 
by a maximum daily wage.51 Some states do not pay prisoners for work on 
regular prison jobs.52 Other states deduct expenses from wages, leaving some 
people with half of an already minimal paycheck.53 This lack of meaningful 
income is compounded by the fact that, in forty-nine states, incarcerated 
individuals must pay for the costs of their incarceration—commonly referred to 
as “pay to stay” debt.54 Lack of employment while incarcerated is another major 
contributing factor to the accrual of debt. 
 
 51 Compare Prison Wages, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/ 
wages/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (“The average of minimum daily wages paid to incarcerated workers for non-
industry prison jobs is now 86 cents . . . The average maximum daily wage for the same prison job had declined 
. . . to $3.45 today.”), and Prison Wage Policies, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
reports/wage_policies.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (providing a detailed report of prison wages according to 
each state), with NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., STATE MINIMUM WAGES, 2019 MINIMUM WAGE BY STATE, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx#:~:targetText=The%20 
Georgia%20state%20minimum%20wage,state%20minimum%20wage%20of%20%245.15 (last visited Sept. 5, 
2020). 
 52 See Prison Wages, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/ 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (showing Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Texas do not pay regular prison 
job workers). 
 53 Id. (providing the example of Massachusetts, which deducts at least half of every paycheck, with the 
other half going to a savings account to pay costs such as court fines and fees and victim witness assessments.). 
 54 For example, Florida has implemented a “pay to stay” scheme in its prison system:  
The state of Florida, which pays inmate workers a maximum of $0.55 per hour, billed former 
inmate Dee Taylor $55,000 for his three-year sentence. He would have had to work 100,000 
hours, or over 11 years nonstop, at a prison wage to pay for his three year incarceration. Even as 
a free man working at Florida’s minimum wage of $8.25, he would have to work more than 6,666 
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An additional source of debt could stem from domestic support obligations. 
The exoneree might also owe taxes or child support if he has children.55 Studies 
measuring the average amount of child support owed by incarcerated individuals 
demonstrate that these payments can be enormous.56 
Another likely source of debt is an exoneree’s attorney’s fees.57 These fees 
might extend to lawyers who provided advocacy prior to the exoneration. In a 
study of the first 250 DNA exonerations, researchers found that only 14% of 
these factually innocent people initially won a reversal on direct appeal.58 Court 
costs and fees can also accumulate to extremely high amounts.59 In other words, 
exonerations involve long legal battles, which can be incredibly expensive and 
can create a substantial source of debt.  
Debt could also stem from being a parolee. If the exoneree was released from 
prison after serving a full sentence and was placed on parole before being 
exonerated, he will have parole fees and fines.60 Parole might also include travel, 
curfews that limit the exoneree’s ability to work certain hours, paying for 
supervision and drug and alcohol testing, and securing approved housing.61 The 
cost of parole or other court supervision can be enormously high, and debt 
 
hours―more than three regular work years―and not spend a penny on anything else to pay it 
back. These debts are impossible for the even hardest-working people to pay off. 
Chandra Bozelko & Ryan Lo, You’ve Served Your Time. Now Here’s Your Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 
2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-prison-strike-labor-criminal-justice_n_5b9bf1a1e4b013b0977 
a7d74.  
 55 Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction 
Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 130 (2010).  
 56 Mona Lewandoski, Barred from Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors in and Outside 
Bankruptcy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 199 (2010) (citations omitted) (“One study estimated that 
thirty-two percent of Ohio inmates had child support obligations, as did seventeen percent of Illinois inmates 
and sixteen percent of Texas inmates. Studies of Colorado and Massachusetts inmates placed the average total 
child support debt at release around $16,000.”). 
 57 Calvin Willis’s fees from trial and post-conviction proceedings totaled over $14,000. Calvin Willis: 
Thank God For DNA, in SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 141 
(Lola Vollen & Dave Eggers, eds., Verso ed. 2017) (discussing an interview with Calvin Willis that was 
conducted by editor Lola Vollen and foreword author Scott Turow); Kahn, supra note 55, at 129.  
 58 Hartung, supra note 26, at 374 n. 32 (“appellate or postconviction courts reversed 14% of exonerees’ 
convictions, or 9% if one excludes capital cases.”) (quoting Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 55, 98 (2008)). 
 59 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 198 (citations omitted). 
 60 REBEKAH DILLER, JUDITH GREENE & MICHELLE JACOBS, MARYLAND’S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A 
BARRIER TO REENTRY 12 (2009), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_ 
Maryland%27s-Parole-Supervision-Fee.pdf (For example, in Maryland, “[t]he mean amount [of supervision 
fees] was $743 and the median was $560. . . . [I]t is not surprising that nine out of ten people on parole will have 
failed to pay the full amount of supervision fee debt when they exit the parole system.” Further, a 17% charge 
for collection is applied when a debt is transferred at the end of a parolee’s parole term.).  
 61 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 225 (citations omitted). 
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resulting from this court supervision should be considered in an exoneree’s 
bankruptcy petition. 
Another consideration is the cost of education. If the exoneree chose to 
pursue an education before or while in prison, he might have accumulated 
student loans. Further, his family members might have decided to pursue an 
education during the wrongful incarceration. The exoneree was denied the 
opportunity to assist with the cost of this education, resulting in further debt. 
Beyond the exoneree’s personal debt is the consideration of his family 
members and the debts that they might have accrued while he was in prison. 
Families often pay for the cost of making phone calls and visits to and from 
prison, as well as contributing to the commissary accounts of their loved ones.62 
The family may have also spent thousands of dollars on representation that did 
not prevent the wrongful conviction.63 For example, Wilton Dedge spent twenty-
two years in prison.64 His parents used their retirement fund and took out a 
second mortgage to pay for his attorney’s fees.65 Vincent Moto spent nine years 
in prison before he was exonerated.66 His mother spent $160,000 on legal fees.67 
Mr. Moto was exonerated in Pennsylvania, which does not yet have a 
compensation statute, leaving him without any aid to help his mother pay the 
fees after exoneration.68 Due to their time in prison and the subsequent efforts 
that were made to obtain exoneration, exonerees and their families are left in 
financial distress. This financial distress is compounded by the lack of resources 
provided to exonerees when they leave prison.  
2. Debt Due to Barriers Faced Upon Release from Prison 
Exonerees also accrue debt due to the barriers they face once they are 
released from prison. While in prison, exonerees have missed the chance to 
 
 62 Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
reports/money.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2020) (estimating that families spend $2.9 billion a year on commissary 
accounts and phone calls.). 
 63 See, e.g., SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 141–57 (Lola 
Vollen & Dave Eggers, eds., Verso ed. 2017); see also Kahn, supra note 55, at 129. 
 64 Wilton Dedge, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/wilton-dedge/ (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 65 Audrey D. Koehler, Comment, Exonerated, Free, and Forgotten: How States Continue to Punish the 
Wrongfully Convicted Through Procedural Hoops and Inadequate Compensation, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 493, 489–
99 (2019). 
 66 Vincent Moto, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/vincent-moto/ (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 67 Koehler, supra note 65, at 499. 
 68 Koehler, supra note 65, at 499. 
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develop professionally, to build skills, and to successfully seek employment 
with robust experience on their resume. 47% of exonerees were twenty-five 
years old or younger at the time of their conviction.69 Of those 1,267 exonerees, 
the average amount of time between conviction and exoneration was thirteen 
years.70 Access to education within prisons has proven to be unsuccessful and 
unhelpful to gaining employment upon release from prison.71 Thus, exonerees—
whose young adult lives were spent in prison—will need access to holistic 
training and educational programs once they are released.72  
Upon release from prison, exonerees face many barriers, including securing 
healthcare, housing, and employment.73 The struggles stemming from these 
barriers are exacerbated by the scant support given to exonerees once released 
from incarceration. These barriers will likely impair an exoneree’s ability to 
climb out of the debt he accumulated while in prison.74 An exoneree might also 
face a range of mental health issues that stem from the trauma he endured while 
incarcerated.75 The debts that stem from these issues should be discharged, as 
they resulted from wrongful conviction.  
II. EXISTING FINANCIAL MECHANISMS TO RESPOND TO WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION 
It has long been argued that exonerees should be granted indemnification for 
their wrongful incarceration.76 Currently, financial remedies provided to 
 
 69 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
 70 Id.  
 71 On the topic of education, Lewandowski notes:  
Prison education may not significantly improve employment prospects or income. One study 
found that a prison GED brought a modest earnings premium for only four years after release. A 
Florida study found little evidence of a prison GED providing any employment benefit, and then 
only for minority offenders, and an Ohio study found that a prison GED had “no effect” on the 
probability of employment.  
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 221 (citations omitted). 
 72 Koehler, supra note 65, at 497.  
 73 INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED ENDURE AND 
HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 8–10, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 74 Koehler, supra note 65, at 498. 
 75 Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Conviction, 5 CRIM. L. 
BRIEF 10 (2010). 
 76 These discussions have been taking place since at least 1932. Bochard and Lutz wrote in their seminal 
book:  
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exonerees are obtained through (a) a state’s compensation statute; (b) a private 
compensation bill; or (c) civil lawsuits. Only thirty-five states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government offer compensation schemes.77 The 
remaining fifteen states do not have compensation statutes, leaving exonerees 
without remedy unless they successfully petition the state legislature for a 
private compensation bill, file a section 1983 civil rights claim, or file a 
common-law tort claim.78 These three methods of obtaining compensation are 
not a reliable or adequate form of providing indemnification to the wrongfully 
convicted. This Section examines the three financial mechanisms that are 
available to purportedly provide remedies to the wrongfully convicted. 
A. Compensation Statutes 
States with statutory schemes provide general and limited remedies for 
wrongful incarceration.79 Some existing statutory schemes have been found to 
“all but guarantee” that exonerees “have no realistic opportunity to prove they 
are deserving of refunds.”80 The amount of money provided by compensation 
statutes varies wildly by state and can vary within each state.81 Many statutes 
 
[w]hen . . . by a misguided or mistaken operation of the governmental machine there is a 
miscarriage of justice and the helpless innocent is actually convicted, the public conscience is 
and ought to be revolted and dismayed. The least the community can do to repair the irreparable, 
is to appease the public conscience by making such restitution as it can by indemnity. 
BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12, at 392. 
 77 Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 78 The fifteen states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. As of 
August 31, 2020, 256 exonerations have taken place in these states. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
 79 But, as Professor Gutman notes, the existing remedies are incomplete and insufficient:  
Such statutes largely ignore the nature, severity, and variation of injuries suffered while 
incarcerated; fail to account for post-release damages, such as ongoing psychological and medical 
harms; and overlook the pressing needs many exonerees have for social, vocational, medical, and 
educational services following what is often years of wrongful incarceration. In sum, most of 
these statutes reflect a begrudging rather than a restorative approach to remedying the harm done 
to the wrongly convicted. 
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371–72. 
 80 Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1260 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring). The Exoneration Act of 
Colorado, and its requirement that defendants prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence a second 
time in order to obtain the refund of fees paid pursuant to their wrongful conviction, violates due process. Id. at 
1255. Justice Alito also questioned why the defendant should not be compensated for “all the adverse economic 
consequences of the wrongful conviction . . . [s]uch as attorney’s fees, lost income, and damage to reputation.” 
Id. at 1261 (Alito, J. concurring).  
 81 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse. 
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place demanding burdens on the exonerees or cap the amount of award that can 
be given.82 This Section considers the ineffectiveness of compensation statutes 
in providing meaningful remedies to the wrongfully convicted. 
It is first helpful to examine the vast differences in compensation statutes 
across states.83 While some states provide more comprehensive models of 
compensation, others fall woefully behind. Texas is one of the five states with 
the most exonerated individuals, with 389 exonerations thus far.84 Texas has 
vastly improved its compensation scheme since the initial compensation 
legislation was passed in 1965.85  
This improvement is found in the Tim Cole Act, which was passed after the 
posthumous exoneration of Timothy Cole. In 1986, Mr. Cole was convicted and 
sentenced to twenty-five years for a rape he did not commit.86 Although the 
actual perpetrator wrote to police and prosecutors to confess in 1995, these 
letters were ignored.87 Mr. Cole died in prison in 1999.88 The court made four 
findings when it posthumously exonerated Mr. Cole in 2009, including that Mr. 
Cole would not have died in prison if the criminal legal system had not failed 
him.89 When Texas passed the Tim Cole Act, compensation for exonerees was 
increased from $50,000 to $80,000 for every year spent in prison.90 In the event 
of a posthumous exoneration, the Act also extends compensation, college 
tuition, and funds for personal and financial planning to the exoneree’s heirs and 
legal representatives.91  
While this compensation scheme offers more compensation to exonerees 
than other schemes, it is far from perfect. For example, Texas does not provide 
 
aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Newton N. Knowles, Exonerated, but Not Free: The Prolonged Struggle for a Second Chance at a 
Stolen Life, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 235, 259 (2015) (“[T]he lack of uniformity among the fifty 
states does little to enhance the integrity of our criminal justice system.”). 
 84 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (the other states in the top five are Illinois, New York, California, and Michigan). 
These states account for 49% of exonerations. Id.  
 85 Id.; John Shaw, Comment, Exoneration and the Road to Compensation: The Tim Cole Act and 
Comprehensive Compensation for Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 593, 604–10 
(2011). 
 86 Timothy Cole, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/timothy-cole/ (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2020).  
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Shaw, supra note 85, at 600–01.  
 90 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.052 (West 2011). 
 91 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.001(c) (West 2011). 
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a cap on attorney’s fees for the wrongfully convicted.92 One Texas attorney, who 
represented thirteen wrongfully convicted clients, claimed he was owed $8 
million from his clients.93 While Texas at least recognized the egregious error 
made during Mr. Cole’s case, there is significant room for improvement, such 
as providing reentry assistance for those who are still living when exonerated. 
On the other end of the spectrum is New Hampshire, the state with both the 
lowest number of exonerations and the lowest cap on compensation.94 New 
Hampshire has had two exonerations and caps compensation for exonerees at 
$20,000.95 Does New Hampshire have such a low compensation cap because of 
the few exonerations that it has had? Or perhaps, do states rely on cases that are 
similarly horrific to Mr. Cole’s case to find the motivation to provide a just and 
adequate compensation scheme to exonerees?  
Only a few states provide reentry assistance to exonerees through statutory 
schemes.96 Further, rather than guaranteeing certain services, some of these 
statutes provide limited assistance by capping the amount of compensation that 
can be directed to obtain reentry services.97 Instead, many exonerees are left to 
locate non-profits that provide reentry assistance.98 
To make matters worse, in states where compensation is capped, the 
wrongfully convicted are not consistently or equitably compensated.99 In a study 
 
 92 Shaw, supra note 85, at 614; but see IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 8241 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (LexisNexis 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 
(LexisNexis 2008). 
 93 Shaw, supra note 85, at 614.  
 94 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020); Compensation Statutes: A National Overview, NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/CompensationByState_ 
InnocenceProject.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 95 NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 96 Massachusetts and Illinois are among a small number of states who provide post-exoneration support 
services along with their monetary compensation schemes. Knowles, supra note 83, at 403; see, e.g., MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5 (West 2018) (“The court may include, as part of its judgment against the 
commonwealth, an order requiring the commonwealth to provide the claimant with services that are reasonable 
and necessary to address any deficiencies in the individual’s physical and emotional condition”); see also VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (West 2015) (“[C]ompensation for any reasonable reintegrative services and mental 
and physical health care costs incurred by the claimant for the time period between his or her release from 
mistaken incarceration and the date of the award.”). 
 97 LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2019) (providing up to $80,000 in “compensation for the loss of life 
opportunities resulting from the time spent incarcerated,” including expenses relating to job skills training, 
education, housing, and any other reasonable services needed). 
 98 See supra Section I(B).  
 99 Gutman, supra note 43, at 403 (“States with compensation caps produce unjustifiable inequalities 
among exonerees within the state.”). 
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of state statutory compensation, Professor Jeffrey Gutman divided different 
statutes into three categories: (1) statutes that provide a daily or annual cap on 
compensation without providing an overall cap on compensation; (2) statutes 
that provide a daily or annual cap on compensation with an overall cap on 
compensation; and (3) an overall cap on damages.100 Gutman critiques each 
category: Category 1 and 2 “depersonalize” the process, “presuming that all 
wrongfully incarcerated persons suffer equally.”101 By providing a cap on total 
compensation, Category 2 “penalize[s] those incarcerated the longest.”102 If their 
total compensation is less than it would have been without the cap, they are 
essentially left without compensation for their later years in prison.103 Similarly, 
in Category 3, those who have served lengthy sentences may not be compensated 
for their later years in prison due to the total cap.104  
A further issue with state statutory compensation schemes is the burden they 
place on exonerees. Some states require the exoneree to prove that he did not 
engage in any misconduct that contributed to his prosecution.105 In some states, 
the exoneree must receive a pardon from the governor, which is a procedural 
step that is not required for a person to be exonerated by law.106 Other states 
require the exoneree to have been exonerated by DNA evidence.107 This raises 
obvious issues in cases where there was no DNA evidence, the DNA evidence 
was destroyed or missing, or the case predated DNA testing and did not involve 
the collection of samples for testing.108 Further, in Florida, exonerees with felony 
convictions prior to their wrongful conviction are ineligible to receive 
compensation through the statutory compensation scheme.109 For example, 
 
 100 Gutman, supra note 43, at 401–02.  
 101 Gutman, supra note 43, at 402.  
 102 Gutman, supra note 43, at 401–02.  
 103 Gutman, supra note 43, at 402.  
 104 Professor Gutman discusses the way Illinois implements this approach:  
Illinois, with the third-highest number of exonerees on the Registry . . . provides capped amounts 
for 0-5 years, 5-14 years, and over 14 years of incarceration . . . One 2010 exoneree received 
$85,350 for a 1.2-year wrongful incarceration, which exceeds $70,000 per year. Another man 
exonerated the same year after 23.1 years of wrongful imprisonment was awarded $199,500, or 
just over $8600 per year.  
Gutman, supra note 43, at 402–03 (citations omitted). 
 105 Gutman, supra note 43, at 371 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422(2) (West 2017); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/2-702(d) (LexisNexis 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(d) (West 2013); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(5)(d) 
(McKinney 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10B (2017)). 
 106 Gutman, supra note 43, at 371 n. 8 (Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee).  
 107 Gutman, supra note 43, at 371 n. 8 (Missouri and Montana).  
 108 Gutman, supra note 43, at 371.  
 109 Gutman, supra note 43, at 371.  
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Derrick Williams served eighteen years after he was convicted in Florida.110 
When Mr. Williams was released from his wrongful incarceration wearing only 
a prison uniform, he was ineligible to receive compensation due to a prior 
nonviolent felony conviction.111  
It is incredibly unjust that someone who has been victimized by the criminal 
legal system should be expected to have lived a life free of mistakes prior to their 
wrongful conviction. Overall, the route to obtaining just compensation through 
state statutes is not a reliable, equitable, or just form of compensation to the 
wrongfully convicted.  
B. Private Compensation Bills 
The second avenue to receiving compensation is through a private bill. The 
exoneree must lobby the state legislature to pass a private bill in order to receive 
compensation from the state treasury.112 Yet private bills present an unreliable, 
inequitable, and inadequate form of compensation.113  
First, in many states where statutory compensation schemes do not exist, 
private bills are barred and therefore unavailable to exonerees.114 Second, in 
states that have allowed private compensation bills, the amount paid to 
exonerees is not proportional to the length of time the exonerees spent in prison. 
For example, in Georgia, Clarence Harrison received $1 million from a private 
bill after serving nearly eighteen years in prison.115 John Jerome White, who 
served more than twenty-two years, received $500,000 from a private bill.116 
 
 110 Derrick Williams, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/derrick-williams/ 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
 111 Koehler, supra note 65, at 496; see also Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 223 (“About two-thirds of 
corrections departments release inmates with their personal savings and cash known as ‘gate money,’ but often 
no more than $200.”) (citation omitted). 
 112 Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated—How to Fund Wrongful-
Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV. 503, 510 (2011) (quoting Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim 
Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665 (2002)). 
 113 See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 94 (“Ultimately, the private bill remedy is an inadequate solution for 
individuals who have been wrongfully convicted.”). 
 114 See, e.g., Gutman, supra note 43, at 372 n. 12.  
 115 Clarence Harrison, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3286#:~:text=Harrison%20was%20released%20from%20custody,
%241%20million%20in%20state%20compensation (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (While Mr. Harrison received 
significantly more than other Georgia exonerees, this Comment will later discuss how his award did not provide 
with the tools to successfully reenter the economy. See infra Section IV(B)(ii).).  
 116 John Jerome White, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3735#:~:text=After%20White%20was%20exonerated%2C%20pros
ecutors,%24500%2C000%20in%20compensation%20to%20White (last visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
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Third, the process relies on the political makeup of the legislature rather than 
on the legal system.117 The exoneree must find a legislator who is not only 
willing to introduce the bill but also willing to find support in both houses.118 
Without a legislator who is well-connected and willing to fight for the bill, 
exonerees have a very slim chance of obtaining compensation through this 
avenue.119 For example, also in Georgia, Sam Scott and Doug Echols did not 
receive compensation following their exoneration despite locating a legislator to 
lobby for them.120 The district attorney who initially convicted the men wrote to 
the legislature to oppose the private bills, alleging that the vacatur of their 
convictions did not establish their innocence.121 Although DNA exonerated 
them, Mr. Scott and Mr. Echols never received compensation, and their criminal 
records were never expunged.122 Further, the district attorney was granted 
qualified immunity for his false statements to the state legislature.123 
Fourth, and finally, the struggle to obtain compensation does not stop once 
the private bill has passed. For example, in one case, although two exonerees 
successfully passed a private bill, the process of actually obtaining the 
compensation spanned decades.124 Overall, the process of obtaining a private 
bill is too challenging to be a reliable form of compensation. The process is 
“susceptible to manipulation by the unscrupulous since the decision to vote an 
award is based upon politicians’ speeches made on the floor of the congress, not 
upon sworn testimony subject to cross examination at a fact-finding hearing.”125 
This process takes virtually all control out of the exoneree’s hands, as he is 
reliant upon the legislative body to make a decision that might ultimately be 
arbitrary rather than just. In sum, private bills are unreliable due to the procedure 
and politics that can slow down or even bar an exoneree from obtaining 
compensation.  
 
 117 See Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What 
Works, What Doesn’t and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 408 (2009).  
 118 Id.  
 119 See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 95.  
 120 ASSOCIATED PRESS, Cleared by DNA, 1 Ga. Man Gets $1M, 2 Get Nothing, DESERET NEWS (July 18, 




 121 Id.; see Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 122 Echols, 913 F.3d at 1318.  
 123 Echols, 913 F.3d at 1326.  
 124 Bernhard, supra note 12, at 95 (It took more than twenty years for two men who were wrongfully 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death to receive compensation.).  
 125 Bernhard, supra note 12, at 95.  
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C. Civil Lawsuits 
The third and final method of obtaining compensation is through civil 
lawsuits. Lawsuits are available for only a small number of cases, as they require 
an exoneree to prove he is a victim of intentional misconduct.126 Although the 
National Registry reports that police, prosecutorial, or other government official 
misconduct contributed to 54% of reported wrongful convictions, many of these 
actors are protected by immunity.127 Section 1983 claims are made more 
complicated by the fact that there is rarely one actor who has caused a wrongful 
conviction, leaving exonerees to somehow prove that “each individual defendant 
deprived him of a specific constitutional right and that the deprivation of this 
constitutional right, in turn, caused his injuries.”128 This is a huge hurdle to 
overcome. 
Even when section 1983 lawsuits are successful, they span many years. 
Walter Swift, for example, spent twenty-six years in prison for a crime that he 
 
 126 Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair 
Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 12, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (“In most cases, there is no 
intentional misconduct that caused the wrongful conviction, or at least, none that can be proven.”). See also 
Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims, 81 
TEMP. L. REV. 689, 692–93 (2008). William O’Dell Harris was wrongfully convicted of sexual assault in West 
Virginia. When the court vacated the conviction six years later, it considered a report by the American Society 
of Crime Laboratory, which showed egregious misconduct on behalf of Fred Zain, the police serologist who 
testified at Mr. Harris’s trial. The court stated: 
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the strength of results; (2) 
overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting 
the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items 
had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as 
conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous 
impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report 
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve 
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a match 
with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results. 
In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 517–18 (W. Va. 1993). 
Later that year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the results of all of the blood tests 
analyzed by Zain were invalid. See Court Invalidates a Decade of Blood Test Results in Criminal Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993 at A.20, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/12/us/court-invalidates-a-decade-of-blood-
test-results-in-criminal-cases.html (This case is an example of an extremely high standard being met due to the 
repeated and systematic misconduct of an actor in a case.). 
 127 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
browse.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2020); see also Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official 
Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 630, 673 (finding that immunities may offer 
municipalities, and their “attached” officials, too much protection from liability); see also Bernhard, supra note 
12, at 87.  
 128 Ravenell, supra note 126, at 692–93. 
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did not commit.129 Although he was released in 2008, he was not awarded $2.5 
million until 2015.130 This amount was the result of a settlement with the City 
of Detroit and was delayed due to the city’s bankruptcy.131 By the time Mr. Swift 
reached this settlement, he had spent seven years since his exoneration fighting 
legal battles.132 One-third of his settlement money went to his lawyers for their 
efforts.133 Mr. Swift is one example of how even “successful” section 1983 
lawsuits can be unhelpful due to the costly and inefficient nature of litigation.  
If an exoneree wishes to bring a civil tort claim, he must know or have reason 
to know of the tortious conduct, and the statute of limitations generally requires 
that the exoneree file the claim within one to three years from this knowledge.134 
The average amount of time between conviction and exoneration is nine years.135 
Since the average time of wrongful incarceration is significantly greater than the 
general requirement of the statute of limitations, it is unlikely that an exoneree 
will be able to meet the requirement of filing a civil tort claim in time.  
Alternatively, if the exoneree wishes to bring a malicious prosecution claim, 
his claim must meet an incredibly high standard. Under the common law, an 
exoneree generally must show that (1) the prosecution initiated a proceeding 
against him; (2) the proceeding terminated in favor of the prosecution; (3) there 
was no probable cause for the proceeding; (4) the primary purpose of the 
prosecution involved malice; and (5) damage resulted from the prosecution.136 
Thus, “an exonerated claimant essentially alleges that a prosecutor maliciously 
brought criminal charges against [him] without probable cause and obtained a 
conviction that resulted in [his] wrongful incarceration as shown by [his] later 
exoneration.”137  
 
 129 Walter Swift, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3673 (last visited Sept 12, 2020). 
 130 Id.  
 131 Ed White, Detroiter Cleared of Rape Settles with City for $2.5M, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 3, 2015, 
4:23 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2015/02/03/walter-swift-detroiter-cleared-
rape-settles-city/22811971/.  
 132 See id.  
 133 Id.  
 134 Bernhard, supra note 12, at 87.  
 135 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
 136 Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and A Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 
36 GA. L. REV. 665, 693 (2002) (citing Dickey v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 286 F.2d 137, 139 (5th 
Cir. 1960)).  
 137 Id.  
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Civil lawsuits present difficult procedural and legal standards that are 
compounded by the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee 
representation in civil proceedings.138 This leaves exonerees to navigate this 
avenue to compensation with potentially no representation. Unsurprisingly, only 
28% of lawsuits pursued by DNA exonerees have been successful in obtaining 
compensation.139 Civil lawsuits are another inadequate mechanism to obtain just 
compensation for wrongful conviction. 
III. OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRESH START THROUGH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The financial support given to exonerees is inadequate. Although the current 
methods to receive compensation are not effective, there is an existing system 
that could aid exonerees in obtaining financial relief: the bankruptcy system. The 
Code strives to grant a “fresh start” to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”140 
Bankruptcy provides an opportunity to aid the wrongfully convicted with the 
financial difficulties they suffer as a result of their wrongful incarceration.  
A. Bankruptcy Basics 
To understand an exoneree’s path to relief through the bankruptcy courts, it 
is important to first consider the basics of a bankruptcy proceeding. Generally, 
a debtor begins the bankruptcy proceeding by filing a bankruptcy petition.141 
The filing of the petition creates the bankruptcy estate.142 The petition is 
accompanied by additional documents, which provide insight into the assets of 
the estate, as well as what is owed by the estate.143 This includes a list of 
creditors, with the amounts and nature of their claims, the source, amount, and 
 
 138 See Eve Brensike Primus, THE ILLUSORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597, 606 (2011) 
(citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)). 
 139 INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED ENDURE AND 
HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 4, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 140 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991). 
 141 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2019).  
 142 Id. § 541(a).  
 143 With the filing of the petition, most debtors must also file a schedule of assets and liabilities, current 
income and expenditures, executory contracts and unexpired leases, and a statement of financial affairs. FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1007(b). In addition, the debtor must file a certificate of credit counseling, a copy of any debt 
repayment developed through that credit counseling, if applicable, any evidence of payment from employers 
received sixty days before filing, a statement of monthly net income and any anticipated increase in income or 
expenses after filing, and a record of any interest the debtor has in federal or state qualified education or tuition 
accounts. 11 U.S.C. § 521. The debtor will also provide the chapter 13 trustee with a copy of tax returns for the 
most recent tax year or years that tax returns for prior years that had not been filed by the time the bankruptcy 
case began. Id. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i).  
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frequency of the debtor’s income, a list of all of the debtor’s property, and a 
detailed list of the debtor’s monthly living expenses.144  
Filing the bankruptcy petition not only creates the bankruptcy estate and 
begins the proceedings, but also initiates the automatic stay.145 The automatic 
stay is a “fundamental protection afforded by the Bankruptcy Code” that stops 
collection actions outside of the bankruptcy forum against the debtor of the 
estate.146  
The automatic stay is designed to effect an immediate freeze of the 
status quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition actions, judicial 
or nonjudicial, in nonbankruptcy fora against the debtor or affecting 
the property of the estate . . . [and] ensures that all claims against the 
debtor will be brought in a single forum, the bankruptcy court.147  
The automatic stay provides a shield to the debtor from any other action against 
him, making it a very important aspect of the fresh start provided by the Code.148  
Certain aspects of the filing of a bankruptcy petition need special 
consideration in the case of an exoneree. For example, the automatic stay does 
not apply to ongoing criminal actions involving the debtor.149 Therefore, the 
automatic stay would protect an exoneree from any collection action claims, 
while allowing him to pursue any ongoing proceeding related to his exoneration 
or compensation.150 Another consideration is whether, if married, an exoneree 
would prefer to file individually or file jointly with a spouse.151 On the other 
hand, the exoneree might not wish for the inclusion of his spouse’s assets in the 
valuation of the bankruptcy estate, as this would entail incorporating more assets 
into the debtor’s repayment plan.152 
 
 144 Id. § 521.  
 145 Id. § 1302(b).  
 146 In re Wingard, 382 B.R. 892, 899 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (citations omitted).  
 147 Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
 148 See Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded Chapter 13 Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 
655, 658 (2005). 
 149 An exception to the automatic stay is “the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or 
proceeding against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1). 
 150 A party can request, after notice and hearing, that the court grant relief from the automatic stay through 
termination, annulment, modification, or conditioning of the stay for cause. Id. § 362(d)(1). Courts have 
discretion in granting these motions. Cause, which is not defined by the Code, has been found to permit litigation 
to continue in a different, more appropriate forum. In re Scarborough-St. James Corp., 535 B.R. 60, 67–68 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2016).  
 151 Id. § 302(a).  
 152 If the exoneree does not wish to file a joint petition, his spouse may will not automatically be entitled 
to discharge in a separate bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Elkins, 562 B.R. 685, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2016). The 
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Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15 create different forms of bankruptcy 
proceedings for different types and needs of debtors.153 Individuals are eligible 
to file in chapters 7, 11, 12, 13, and 15 bankruptcy.154 This section explains why 
chapter 13 would be the preferable chapter for an exoneree, and how an exoneree 
would move through such a proceeding. 
B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
There are many reasons for an exoneree to file for bankruptcy under chapter 
13 over the other chapters. First, “[t]he purpose of chapter 13 is to enable an 
individual, under court supervision and protection, to develop and perform under 
a plan for the repayment of his debts.”155 Second, chapter 13 allows debtors to 
keep their property throughout the bankruptcy proceedings.156 By contrast, a 
chapter 7 case requires debtors to surrender all pre-bankruptcy property.157 The 
chapter 7 case divides all-pre bankruptcy property and distributes it to the 
creditors in the case.158 Third, chapter 13 discharge is broader than the discharge 
 
former spouse of a wrongfully convicted man moved to reopen her separate bankruptcy case. She argued that 
the trustee of her estate should be allowed to file an amended tax return due to a change in federal law that allows 
exonerees to exclude money obtained through civil damages, restitution, or other monetary award due to 
wrongful conviction from their tax filings. She argued that she was entitled to this tax refund as well. The district 
court stated, “[t]he bankruptcy court properly interpreted § 139F and determined that claims or suits for refund 
would be futile because the Debtors are not wrongfully incarcerated individuals; therefore, they may not avail 
themselves of the exclusion from gross income set forth in § 139F as a matter of law.” Id.  
 153 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7 provides for liquidation proceedings. Chapter 7 can be filed for by 
individuals and corporations and is the most common type of bankruptcy case); id. §§ 901–946 (Municipalities 
and other governmental entities file for chapter 9 bankruptcy); id. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11 proceedings are 
reorganization proceedings and are typically pursued by legal entities, not individuals); id. §§ 1201–1232 
(Chapter 12 is a debtor who is a family farmer or fisherman with a regular income); id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter 
13 allows for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income); id. §§ 1501–1532 (Chapter 15 is 
reserved for ancillary and cross-border cases). 
 154 Id. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7 provides for liquidation proceedings. Chapter 7 can be filed for by 
individuals and corporations and is the most common type of bankruptcy case); id. § 901–946 (Municipalities 
and other governmental entities file for chapter 9 bankruptcy); id. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11 proceedings are 
reorganization proceedings and are typically pursued by legal entities, not individuals); id. §§ 1201–1232 
(Chapter 12 is a debtor who is a family farmer or fisherman with a regular income); id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter 
13 allows for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income); id. §§ 1501–1532 (Chapter 15 is 
reserved for ancillary and cross-border cases). 
 155 In re Pierre, 468 B.R. 419, 424–25 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977)). 
 156 Bein, supra note 148, at 667–68. 
 157 Compare Chapter 13–Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) 
(Chapter 13 allows a debtor to pay debt over 3-5 years and keep property), with Chapter 7–Bankruptcy Basics, 
UNITED STATES COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-
bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (A chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding requires debtors to sell their 
nonexempt property and distribute the proceeds to creditors). 
 158 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A)–(C) (2019) (A “creditor” is “an entity that has a claim against the debtor 
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor; [an] entity that has a claim against 
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available in chapter 7, leaving a greater opportunity for more of the debtor’s debt 
to be discharged.159 While chapter 13 cases are typically longer than chapter 7 
cases and thus require more legal fees, this Comment argues that an exoneree 
should be entitled to both an expedited discharge and a bankruptcy attorney at 
no cost.160 With a bankruptcy attorney assigned cost-free to the exoneree, 
chapter 13 offers the best way for him to achieve a fresh start.  
1. Eligibility for Chapter 13  
To be eligible for chapter 13, a debtor must (1) be an individual; (2) have a 
regular income; and (3) meet certain debt limitations.161 Courts have not required 
a particularly strong showing of regular income, and the exoneree could 
potentially argue that pending compensation could meet this standard.162 
Chapter 13 also requires that both bankruptcy petitions and payment plans be 
filed in good faith.163 Good faith is considered by using a subjective test that 
considers the totality of the debtor’s circumstances.164 If the court determines a 
lack of good faith, it may dismiss the case or convert the case to chapter 7.  
Courts first consider whether the bankruptcy petition was filed in good faith. 
Factors considered by courts include:  
The nature of the debtor’s debts; the timing of the petition; how the 
debts in question arose; the debtor’s motive in filing the petition; how 
the debtor’s actions affected creditors; the debtor’s treatment of 
creditors both before and after the petition was filed; and whether the 
debtor has been forthcoming with the bankruptcy court and the 
creditors.165 
 
the estate . . . or an entity that has a community claim.”). 
 159 Bein, supra note 148, at 668. 
 160 Dickerson, supra note 2, at 629. 
 161 Currently, individuals with assets less than $394,725 in unsecured debt and $1,184,200 in secured debt 
may filed for chapter 13 relief, though the amount is amended by Congress occasionally. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).  
 162 If the exoneree has been unable to secure employment, the Chapter 13 proof of income requirement 
could also be satisfied by a spouse if the petition is filed jointly. See Robert G. Drummond, Disposable Income 
Requirements Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 MONT. L. REV. 423, 424 (1996) (“[T]he disposable 
income requirement is a flexible concept which has challenged the interpretive power of the courts.”).  
 163 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).  
 164 Bein, supra note 148, at 657 (“The evaluation of a debtor’s good faith, which relies not on the 
application of a mechanical or mathematical test, but instead on a judge’s assessment of whether the facts and 
circumstances, in their totality, meet a broadly defined conceptual standard, is inherently subjective.”).  
 165 Bein, supra note 148, at 671 (citing In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Cabral, 285 
B.R. 563, 573 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002); In re Kerschner, 246 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000); In re Goddard, 
212 B.R. 233, 237–38 (D.N.J. 1997)). 
SELDEN_12.16.20 12/16/2020 2:14 PM 
2020] THE DEBT PARADOX 121 
The good faith test is “one of the central, perhaps the most important 
confirmation finding to be made by the court in any chapter 13 case.”166 The 
burden of proving good faith lies with the debtor.167 If an exoneree were to file 
for bankruptcy, these factors would help a court evaluate the reason he filed the 
chapter 13 petition.  
The exoneree’s wrongful incarceration will affect a court’s analysis of the 
factors. For example, the timing of filing the petition is often at issue. If a debtor 
files a petition too long after the accrual of the debt, a court might weigh that 
fact against them when considering his eligibility for chapter 13. But an 
exoneree would have a strong counterargument because it is nearly impossible 
to file a bankruptcy petition from prison. Similarly, a debtor must meet with his 
appointed trustee and creditors.168 Neither the debtor nor the court can waive this 
meeting.169 Courts have held that missing a deadline or failing to file a motion 
properly due to incarceration is not justifiable.170 But incarcerated individuals 
are almost always unable to file bankruptcy due to these limitations.171 
Exonerees should not be further punished for their wrongful incarceration 
because they could not overcome these limitations while in prison.  
The next question to be analyzed is whether the chapter 13 payment plan 
was proposed in good faith. The court analyzes the following factors:  
The amount of the proposed plan payments and the amount of the 
debtor’s surplus; the duration of the plan; the percentage of payment 
to unsecured creditors; whether the debtor has stated his debts and 
expenses accurately; the debtor’s employment history, ability to earn, 
and likelihood of future increases in income; the frequency with which 
the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Code; the existence 
of special circumstances (such as inordinate medical expenses); the 
nature of the debt sought to be discharged; the debtor’s motivation and 
sincerity in seeking chapter 13 relief; the extent of preferential 
treatment between classes of creditors; whether the debtor has unfairly 
manipulated the Bankruptcy Code; whether the debt to be discharged 
would be nondischargeable in a case under chapter 7; whether the 
debtor has made any fraudulent misrepresentations to mislead the 
bankruptcy court; the extent to which secured claims are modified; and 
 
 166 Bein, supra note 148, at 673 (citiation omitted). 
 167 Bein, supra note 148, at 674 (citations omitted). 
 168 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 201 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 341(d)). 
 169 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 201 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 341(d)). 
 170 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 201. 
 171 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 203. 
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the burden which the plan’s administration would impose on the 
trustee.172 
Under this analysis of good faith, the debtor’s pre-petition behavior is heavily 
weighted.173 Some of these factors for exonerees—such as employment history, 
the existence of special circumstances, motivation and sincerity in seeking 
chapter 13 relief, and the nature of the debt sought to be discharged—will look 
much different than they would for an ordinary debtor. An exoneree will not 
have the same ability to demonstrate a productive employment history or credit 
history due to his wrongful incarceration.  
Courts have also emphasized how chapter 13 focuses on the accountability 
of the debtor.174 Although the hardships endured by an exoneree reentering 
society are foreseeable, they are also the result of a “sufficient and proximate 
cause.”175 An exoneree’s wrongful conviction is the proximate cause of many 
financial and personal difficulties he faces upon release from prison.176 An 
exoneree should not be held accountable for debts that were outside of his 
control while he was wrongfully incarcerated, nor should he be held accountable 
for debts that accumulated as a result of wrongful incarceration. 
Within fourteen days of filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor must file a 
repayment plan unless granted an extension by the court.177 The chapter 13 plan 
must propose a strategy to repay a portion, or in rare circumstances, all of the 
debtor’s debt, over the course of three to five years.178 Regardless of whether the 
plan has been approved by the court, the debtor must begin making plan 
payments to the trustee within thirty days of filing the bankruptcy petition.179 
The chapter 13 plan may be modified either before or after confirmation by the 
court.180 
A chapter 13 case ends in a few different circumstances: (1) the plan has 
been successfully completed; (2) the case has been converted to chapter 7; or (3) 
 
 172 Bein, supra note 148, at 675 (citations omitted). 
 173 Bein, supra note 148, at 674. 
 174 In re Grice, 319 B.R. 141, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004) (The court declined to “elevate this statutory 
requirement and does not see any policy that would be served by reading into the statute a more heightened 
showing” under the factual circumstances of the case.). 
 175 In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. 836, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999). 
 176 See supra Section I(C). 
 177 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b). 
 178 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(1), 1322(d) (2019).  
 179 Id. § 1326(a)(1). 
 180 Id. §§ 1323, 1329(a). 
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the debtor receives a discharge from his debt.181 The debtor will receive a 
discharge only if the plan has been confirmed and payments under the plan have 
been made or have been judicially excused.182 One path to judicial excusal is 
through the hardship discharge, which is analyzed below.  
2. The Hardship Discharge 
The general discharge mechanism is one of the greatest benefits of chapter 
13 bankruptcy and is reserved for those who are deserving of a fresh start: 
[w]hen put to the test, bankruptcy law turns to the subjective 
application of moral principles in order to satisfy society’s need for the 
just and equitable balancing of the debtor’s interest in a fresh start with 
society’s desire to deny the privileges of discharge to those who have 
behaved reprehensibly and have failed to act to remedy their 
wrongdoing.183 
Chapter 13 of the Code allows for the discharge of debt for natural persons after 
the following occurs: (1) the filing of the bankruptcy petition; (2) objections 
from the creditors to the debtor’s eligibility for a chapter 13 bankruptcy; (3) 
proofs of claims filed by the creditors; (4) a plan, as proposed by the debtor; (5) 
confirmation of the plan by the court; (6) fulfillment of the plan by the debtor; 
and (7) discharge of debt.184 Chapter 13 allows “an insolvent individual to 
discharge certain unpaid debts toward that end.”185  
If the chapter 13 plan is confirmed, but the debtor is unable to fulfill the 
obligations of the plan, he may request a hardship discharge.186 The discharge is 
instrumental to the “fresh start” policy because it generally protects debtors from 
efforts to collect pre-petition debt and also voids any personal liability for 
discharged debt.187 Section 1328(b) of the Code provides that, in order to 
 
 181 If a chapter 13 debtor is unable to complete plan payments, he may request that the case be converted 
to chapter 7 and that his estate be liquidated. Id. § 1307(a). If the case is converted, the confirmation plan is 
effectively vacated. The goal of an exoneree filing for bankruptcy is likely not to liquidate his estate and 
surrender his property, so it is unlikely that the exoneree would make such a request. Ahart, supra note 16, at 
584 n.132. But see In re Dudley, 405 B.R. 790, 799 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (citing In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639, 
647–48 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)).  
 182 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328. 
 183 Bein, supra note 148, at 687 (citations omitted). 
 184 164 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 239 (2017). 
 185 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007); see Thomas B. McNamara, 
Fresh Start at the Bankruptcy Court, 47 COLO. LAW. 12, 12 (2018) (“The cornerstone of American bankruptcy 
law is the chance for a ‘fresh start.’”). 
 186 164 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 239 (2017). 
 187 Bein, supra note 148, at 658 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2019)).  
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successfully obtain a hardship discharge, the debtor must demonstrate: (1) he 
cannot make all payments due to circumstances for which the debtor “should not 
justly be held accountable”; (2) the value of property distributed under the plan 
would be no less than what would be distributed in a chapter 7 case; and (3) 
modification under section 1329 “is not practicable.”188 The right to discharge 
“is statutory and should be liberally construed so as to give the honest but 
unfortunate debtor a fresh start in life.”189 Further, while creditors may object to 
the dischargeability of debt, the grant or denial of a request for a hardship 
discharge is ultimately left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court.190  
Although a chapter 13 plan typically lasts three to five years, this Comment 
argues that, due to the dire nature of their circumstances, exonerees should be 
entitled to an expedited hardship discharge. By virtue of being wrongfully 
convicted, an exoneree has spent unjustified time in the criminal legal system, 
through the process of investigation and conviction, appeals, wrongful 
incarceration, and exoneration. Thus, it is important that an exoneree not only 
have the choice to enter into a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, but also that 
an exoneree be entitled to an expedited hardship discharge of his debt. The 
exoneree should have the choice of whether he would like to engage further with 
the United States court system. Although litigation could end in financial relief 
for the exoneree and his family, his trust in the legal system is not likely to be 
high. An exoneree should meet the requirements set forth by section 1328(b), 
qualifying them for a hardship discharge, as analyzed below. 
a. Circumstances Beyond the Exoneree’s Control 
The first prong of the hardship discharge is whether the debtor cannot make 
all plan payments because of circumstances that are beyond his control. Due to 
the barriers exonerees face throughout reentry, obtaining employment and 
successfully completing a payment plan would be challenging. These barriers 
stem from their wrongful incarceration, which was a circumstance beyond their 
control. Courts have interpreted this element of the hardship discharge 
differently.191 Courts rely on a fact-driven analysis of whether the debtor should 
be held justly accountable, including factors such as:  
 
 188 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2019). 
 189 In re Lambert, 10 B.R. 223, 226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 190 In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. 836, 838 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999); Bein, supra note 148, at 663 (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 727(a)); see Ahart, supra note 16, at 583.  
 191 See In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. at 839–40 (“[M]ost bankruptcy courts that have addressed the issue have 
allowed a hardship discharge only when a debtor has suffered from catastrophic circumstances that directly 
cause the debtor to be unable to complete plan payments . . . We are unwilling to read the word catastrophic into 
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a) whether the debtor has presented substantial evidence that he or 
she had the ability and intention to perform under the plan at the 
time of confirmation; 
b) whether the debtor did materially perform under the plan from 
the date of confirmation until the date of the intervening event or 
events; 
c) whether the intervening event or events were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of confirmation of the chapter 13 plan; 
d) whether the intervening event or events are expected to continue 
in the reasonably foreseeable future; 
e) whether the debtor had control, direct or indirect, of the 
intervening event or events; and 
f) whether the intervening event or events constituted a sufficient 
and proximate cause for the failure to make the required 
payments.192 
The most difficult element of the hardship discharge for the exoneree to satisfy 
will likely be that the debtor must be unable to complete the bankruptcy plan 
payments due to circumstances that did not exist and were not foreseeable at the 
time of the plan confirmation.193 Clearly, if an exoneree is arguing that his 
wrongful conviction is the “intervening event” that justifies his motion for a 
hardship discharge, the “intervening event” happened long before filing for 
bankruptcy and was thus foreseeable. 
Yet an exoneree could argue that he should be eligible for a hardship 
discharge despite the timing of the intervening event. Chapter 13 discharge is 
left to the court’s discretion.194 A study examining whether “non-law 
determinations” influenced judicial rulings on the discharge of debt indicates 
that more sympathetic causes of debt might make a judge more likely to 
discharge debt.195 Surely a wrongful conviction warrants judicial sympathy.  
 
the statute.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 192 Id. at 840. 
 193 See In re Edwards, 207 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997). 
 194 In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. at 838. 
 195 This study included 201 bankruptcy judges (who represented 57% of all sitting bankruptcy judges at 
the time) who were presented with a question of the discharge of credit card debt in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case. 
This study presented four different conditions for the accumulation of the debtor’s recent debt: (1) a “vacationer,” 
who incurred the debt while on spring break in Florida. The vacationer paid for a hotel room, meals, and drinks 
with friends; and (2) a “caretaker,” who accumulated the debt while visiting her mother in Florida because her 
mother was fighting cancer, did not have health insurance, and needed help recovering from surgery. Scenarios 
3 and 4 included a vacationer and caretaker debtor, but of a different gender. Although in all scenarios the debt 
was incurred knowing that it could not be repaid, only 32% of judges discharged the vacationer’s debt and 52% 
of judges discharged the caretaker’s debt. The study found that the judges “apparently allowed their sympathy 
or respect for the debtor who fraudulently incurred the credit card debt to care for his or her mother to influence 
their decisions.” Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges 
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b. Chapter 7 Analysis 
The second prong of the hardship discharge requires the value of property 
distributed under the plan to be no less than what would be distributed in a 
chapter 7 case. This prong is also known as the Best Interests Test, which works 
to ensure that chapter 13 unsecured creditors are no worse off at the end of the 
case than if the debtor had filed a chapter 7 petition.196 In a chapter 7 case, if the 
lower priority, unsecured creditors are not paid through the operation of the plan, 
the debtor’s remaining assets can be liquidated to make up for this deficit.197 
Thus, in chapter 13, the value of the property to be distributed to each allowed 
unsecured claim must be greater than or equal to the amount that would be paid 
on the same claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7.198 
This test promotes the twin aims of the bankruptcy system, as it functions as a 
safeguard for creditors in chapter 13 cases.199  
However, due to the amount of debt incarcerated individuals can accumulate 
during prison and the amount of lost opportunity to earn meaningful wages while 
incarcerated and after release, it is unlikely that the bankruptcy estate will have 
any value.200 If this is true, the second prong of the hardship discharge test will 
be satisfied.201 Courts have held that a chapter 13 plan will qualify for a hardship 
discharge if an estate’s value is so low it would not allow distribution to 
unsecured creditors. 202 This prong of the hardship discharge should not be 
difficult for the exoneree to satisfy because his estate is likely to be of little value 
due to his time in prison.  
 
Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 887–90 (2015).  
 196 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2019); Midstate Fin. Co., Inc. v. Peoples, 587 B.R. 685, 691 (E.D. Tenn. 2018). 
 197 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
 198 Id. § 1325(a)(4); see In re Chavis, 47 F.3d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 199 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 196 (“Bankruptcy’s great economic virtue is that it avoids the collective 
action problem among creditors who would otherwise compete against one another for the debtor’s funds; it 
instead benefits creditors by allowing them to recover or write off debt in an orderly, predictable, and cost-
effective manner.”). 
 200 See supra Section I(C). 
 201 See Matter of Mixson, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1674, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2016) (holding that 
as the sole provider of her family due to her ex-husband’s incarceration, she should not be held accountable for 
funding a payment plan while her husband is incarcerated and unemployed). 
 202 In re Watkins, 379 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“Because the liquidation of the [] estate in 
a hypothetical chapter 7 case would yield no funds for distribution to unsecured creditors, regardless of the 
validity of the Debtor’s claimed exemptions, the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemptions is 
MOOT and the Objection to the Plan . . . must be overruled.”); In re Marrero, 7 B.R. 589, 590 (Bankr. D. P.R. 
1980) (although hardship discharge was denied for other reasons, the debtor met the chapter 7 requirement of 
the hardship discharge because of a zero-asset estate.); In re Cummins, 266 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
2001). 
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c. Modification of the Plan 
The third prong of the hardship discharge evaluates whether modification of 
the payment plan is practicable. If the debtor is unable to make the plan 
payments, he can move the court to adjust the plan, which would allow him to 
make smaller payments.203 If the debtor’s living expenses exceed his earned 
after-tax income, further plan payments can be deemed impossible.204 Plan 
modifications or adjustments are unlikely to be allowed unless there is a clear, 
effective remedy for the debtor.205 Courts have held that it is not practicable to 
change a plan where there is no source of income to fund the modified plan.206 
This is especially true in the case of an exoneree, considering the many 
challenges that he faces.207  
d. Exceptions to Discharge 
Certain types of debt are excepted from chapter 13 discharge, yet there is a 
clear argument to allow these exceptions in light of the extreme circumstances 
surrounding wrongful conviction. For example, student loans are consistently 
excluded from chapter 7 and chapter 13 discharge. It is possible that an exoneree 
accumulated both student loans and interest on his student loans before or during 
his time in prison. Courts have allowed the discharge of student loans in the 
event of undue hardship.208  
The undue hardship discharge for student loan claims relies on a demanding 
test, for which “only the most sympathetic can qualify.”209 This test is articulated 
in Brunner, and requires that the debtor: (1) cannot maintain a “minimal” 
standard of living; (2) has additional circumstances exist that would prevent this 
“minimal” standard of living to change for a significant portion of the repayment 
period of student loans; and (3) must have made good faith efforts to repay the 
loans.210 Perhaps helpfully, “[s]ome courts have held that a criminal record, 
because of its negative effect on earning capacity, can help the debtor meet the 
 
 203 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)–(2). 
 204 Ahart, supra note 16, at 576–78. 
 205 Id. (“But nearly all courts have denied such a request.”). 
 206 See In re Cummins, 266 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); see supra Section I for an explanation 
of the challenges that an exoneree might face that would make modifying a payment plan impracticable. 
 207 See Matter of Mixson, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1674, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2016) (holding that 
modifying the payment plan of the ex-wife of an incarcerated man would not be practicable as she was 
unemployed on the Petition date, and her prospects of employment were minimal). 
 208 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210. 
 209 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210. 
 210 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210 n. 108 (citing Brunner v. NY State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 
F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
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undue hardship exception; others have emphatically rejected that reasoning.”211 
If a criminal record has aided an undue hardship exception claim, then surely a 
criminal record that resulted from a wrongful conviction would be helpful in an 
undue hardship claim for student loans that accumulated as a result of wrongful 
conviction. 
There are additional exceptions to the hardship discharge of section 1328(b), 
including those defined by section 523(a).212 Exceptions to discharge underlie 
the notion that the Code attempts to provide equitable treatment to debtors and 
creditors.213 Generally, the exceptions “can be loosely grouped into two 
categories: those implicating overriding policy issues and those implicating the 
debtor’s own misconduct.”214 The first category of exceptions includes tax 
claims, child support or alimony, debts for injuries to person or property, debts 
to governmental units for fines and penalties, certain educational loans, and 
obligations affected by fraud or maliciousness.215 The second category of 
exceptions:  
[I]s designed to advance the fundamental policy of affording relief 
only to the ‘honest but unfortunate’ debtor . . . including: debts arising 
from the debtor’s fraudulent conduct; claims arising from willful and 
malicious injury caused by the debtor; criminal fines and restitution 
obligations; claims arising from injury or death caused by the debtor 
while driving while intoxicated; and claims for which discharge was 
denied in a prior bankruptcy case.216 
Bankruptcy courts have found that a chapter 13 discharge does not discharge 
any debt that is listed as an exception set forth by the Code.217  
Although these exceptions could present a barrier for the exoneree, there is 
still an avenue to relief through a hardship discharge. First, courts have held in 
favor of debtors in order to provide the fresh start that bankruptcy can give to a 
debtor.218 Second, if eligible for relief, discharging attorney’s fees would likely 
 
 211 Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210 (citing In re Douglas, 366 B.R. 241, 257–59 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 
2007); In re Coman, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1361, at *3, *5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2003)). 
 212 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(17) (2019) (“[F]or a fee imposed on a prisoner by any court for the filing of a case, 
motion, complaint, or appeal, or for other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing”). 
 213 See Bein, supra note 148, at 665. 
 214 Bein, supra note 148, at 665. 
 215 11 U.S.C. § 523(a); Bein, supra note 148, at 665. 
 216 Bein, supra note 148, at 666 (citations omitted). 
 217 11 U.S.C. § 523; id. § 1328; see In re Humphries, 516 B.R. 856 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re 
Vasquez, 261 B.R. 654 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).  
 218 In re Howard, 339 B.R. 913, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (“To advance the policy of giving the debtor 
a fresh start in bankruptcy, exceptions to discharge are construed strictly against the creditor and liberally in 
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provide an enormous amount of relief to the exoneree. Some courts have held 
that “pay to stay debt” is not excepted from discharge.219 Discharging debt 
stemming from attorney’s fees and the exoneree’s family members during the 
time of his imprisonment would help all parties obtain a semblance of a fresh 
start through the bankruptcy system. 
IV. INCLUDING EXONEREES IN THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
This Section describes what providing the wrongfully convicted access to 
the bankruptcy system would entail. Part A proposes how exonerees could gain 
access to the bankruptcy system. Part B discusses the benefits of discharging the 
debts of exonerees, including the potential symbiotic relationship between the 
criminal legal system and the bankruptcy system. Finally, Part C addresses 
potential criticisms of the implications of including exonerees in the hardship 
discharge.  
A. Proposal 
Exonerees should be entitled to an expedited chapter 13 discharge. Further, 
states should provide more holistic reentry programs, including access to 
bankruptcy attorney services. This proposal outlines what providing an exoneree 
meaningful access to the bankruptcy system would entail.  
Relief could be obtained through the hardship discharge provided by chapter 
13 of the Code. An exoneree can obtain relief through the hardship discharge by 
passing the three-part test of section 1328(b).220 An exoneree would also need 
to demonstrate that he filed his bankruptcy petition in good faith and that his 
proposed confirmation plan was filed in good faith. This subjective analysis of 
good faith would surely tilt in the exoneree’s favor, as he is seeking discharge 
from debts that are a result of the miscarriage of justice that caused his wrongful 
conviction. For the reasons set forth above, exonerees should meet the 
requirements of this test.  
While the bankruptcy system provides this opportunity to aid exonerees, 
exonerees need representation throughout these proceedings. If the exoneree is 
filing for bankruptcy following a prison term, it is unlikely that he has 
 
favor of the debtor.”).  
 219 In re Milan, 546 B.R. 187, 198 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016), aff’d, 556 B.R. 922 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2016) 
(“[T]he Incarceration Costs are compensation for actual pecuniary loss within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). As 
such, they are dischargeable and were discharged.”). 
 220 See supra pages 34–35; 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b). 
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accumulated wealth due to the many circumstances surrounding his wrongful 
conviction and the potential subsequent accumulation of debt. Exonerees face 
many challenges when reentering society; obtaining and paying for a bankruptcy 
attorney could seem impossible.  
Reentry programs would help if properly tailored to address individualized 
needs. An exoneree would have a more meaningful opportunity to obtain 
financial relief if provided reentry services that guarantee access to bankruptcy 
attorney services. It would be even more beneficial for these programs to ensure 
that the exoneree has an attorney who specializes in bankruptcy law.221 Finally, 
providing a bankruptcy attorney would avoid the issue of an exoneree being 
represented by his prior attorney, who is likely a claimant in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
After Innocence is one model reentry program that coordinates access to 
bankruptcy representation for exonerees. This organization is dedicated to 
working with exonerees through a three-part program, including providing 
access to bankruptcy attorneys.222 It recognizes the importance of a holistic 
approach to assisting exonerees with reentry and could be used as a model for 
future assistance given to exonerees. If states implemented similarly holistic 
reentry models, states could begin to reconcile the enormous debt owed to 
exonerees due to their wrongful conviction.  
Sadly, no amount of compensation can rectify the damage inflicted by 
wrongful incarceration.223 Yet if exonerees and their families received an 
expedited discharge from the debt accumulated during the period of wrongful 
incarceration, the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system could help 
provide a fresh start for an exoneree’s financial future.  
B. Benefits of Discharging the Debts of Exonerees  
Discharging the debts of exonerees would be beneficial to both the 
bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system. The first part of this section 
 
 221 See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 3, at 1119–20 (“Accordingly, if a debtor is to successfully navigate the 
complex path that ultimately culminates in a discharge, it stands to reason that the assistance of an expert will 
be indispensable in doing so.”). 
 222 Connecting Exonerees to the Support They Are Eligible For, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.after-
innocence.org/coordinating (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (coordinating access to health care, social services, and 
legal representation for record expungement, restoration of rights and public benefits, housing issues, domestic 
support, and bankruptcy or tax problems.). 
 223 Shaw, supra note 85, at 613 (“Money is not what makes these individuals whole. The only way to truly 
restore these individuals to any semblance of their previous lives is to reintegrate them into society so they 
function as normal citizens.”). 
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considers how the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system could work 
collaboratively. The second part of this Section considers two exonerees’ 
experience with financial distress and describes how proactively providing them 
with an expedited hardship discharge could have helped avoid this financial 
distress. 
1. Symbiotic Relationship 
Both systems share the common goal of providing a fresh start: the 
bankruptcy system attempts to provide this fresh start through the discharge of 
debt, while the criminal legal system attempts to provide this fresh start through 
reentry programs. Yet both systems rely on ineffective mechanisms to provide a 
clean slate. Some argue that “chapter 13, as currently constituted, is deeply 
debilitated.”224 Critics have pointed to the racial bias prevalent in the bankruptcy 
system:  
[s]pecifically, the debtor who benefits the most from the relief 
provided in the Code is married, has few non-dischargeable debts [], 
has stable employment and disposable income, and has wealth that is 
concentrated in assets that are protected from creditors[]. Given that, 
the “Ideal Debtor” is white [].225  
Further, bankruptcy courts have a history of being inaccessible to indigent 
populations,226 with lower-income debtors facing more bias than a middle-class 
debtor.227 The likelihood of a pro se debtor being successful in bankruptcy court 
is staggeringly low, as contrasted with a debtor who has representation.228 The 
 
 224 Lawrence Ponoroff, Rethinking Chapter 13, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017); see Dickerson, supra note 2, 
at 629.  
 225 See Dickerson, supra note 2, at 639. 
 226 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 457 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Congress may say that some 
of the poor are too poor even to go bankrupt. I cannot agree.”); see Pardo, supra note 3, at 1115 (“[B]ankruptcy 
poignantly presents an affordability paradox: the system’s purpose is to relieve individuals from financial 
distress, yet it simultaneously demands a significant commitment of resources to obtain such relief”). 
 227 On class biases in the bankruptcy system, Lewandowski notes: 
[B]ias in the Bankruptcy Code against low-income debtors’ economic culture makes bankruptcy 
more burdensome for them than for middle-class debtors. These factors deter bankruptcy in 
marginal cases by increasing the debtor’s perceived cost of filing, depriving debtors, creditors, 
and society of the benefits the Bankruptcy Code is designed to provide. Bankruptcy can be 
thought of as a public penance of austerity and submission to court authority that serves as a 
substitute for payment and acknowledges the legitimacy of the creditors’ interests. Under this 
articulation, a more arduous performance is unfairly being required of lower-income debtors 
because of their economic status. 
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 228. 
 228 Pardo, supra note 3, at 1115 (showing self-represented debtors have a 28.5% litigation success rate 
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complexity of the bankruptcy system creates an irony: someone experiencing 
financial distress is essentially barred from filing for bankruptcy if he is too poor. 
The debtor must navigate complex procedural barriers and faces a serious risk 
of denial of discharge despite the merits of his claim.229  
The similarity between the twin aims of the bankruptcy system and the 
purpose of reentry programs for exonerees provides ample reason for the 
criminal legal system and the bankruptcy system to develop a collaborative 
process. The Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1934 
has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public 
as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at 
the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
preexisting debt.230 
While the bankruptcy system presents a goal of providing relief to honest 
but unfortunate debtors, the current inaccessibility of bankruptcy courts renders 
this goal meaningless.231 Further, “[t]he bankruptcy discharge is a powerful 
statutory right, but that right will have no value to intended beneficiaries who 
cannot vindicate it as a result of procedural barriers.”232 By discharging the debts 
that stem from wrongful conviction, the bankruptcy system would implement a 
tool that provides mutual benefit to both the criminal legal system and the 
bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy system would thus recommit to its intended 
purpose “to allow and encourage debtors, freed from their debts, to once again 
become productive members of society.”233 Meanwhile, the criminal legal 
system would greatly improve reentry assistance to exonerees.  
2. Proactivity Rather than Reactivity 
This Section considers two examples of exonerees experiencing financial 
distress. In both cases, had a bankruptcy attorney been provided to the exoneree 
 
while a similarly situated debtor with representation has a 56.2% success rate). 
 229 Pardo, supra note 3, at 1116 (“Unfortunately, vindicating the right to a discharge has proved to be 
elusive for certain individual debtors, not so much as a result of substantive eligibility rules,’ but rather because 
of procedural barriers that increase the complexity of accessing the right.”). 
 230 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citation omitted). 
 231 Pardo, supra note 3, at 1180.  
 232 Pardo, supra note 3, at 1180. 
 233 Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Comment, The Paradoxical Bankruptcy Discharge: Rereading the Common 
Law – Civil Law Relationship, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 293, 319 (2014). 
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following his release from prison, financial distress could have been preempted 
or greatly alleviated.  
Financial literacy is already a struggle for many people in the United 
States.234 This struggle is only exacerbated by time spent in prison and away 
from society and the economy. By allowing exonerees to take control of their 
financial status before they find themselves in financial hardship, the bankruptcy 
system could prevent more dire outcomes.  
Recall Clarence Harrison.235 While the $1 million he received was more than 
many exonerees in Georgia have been awarded,236 his story illustrates how the 
current compensation structures in the United States are failing.237 Mr. Harrison, 
who obtained three jobs after his release from prison, sold $735,000 of future 
payments for $272,000.238 With a lack of credit history due to his incarceration, 
he owed 30% interest on the credit cards he obtained following his release.239 
Shortly thereafter, he was hit by a car and severely injured. 240 Mr. Harrison’s 
wife’s insurance only covered part of his hospital stay and left them with a 
$50,000 medical bill.241 While in the hospital, he also lost his business.242 
Moreover, he learned that he owed the Internal Revenue Service $90,000 in 
taxes on an annuity that he had not known he would have to pay.243 Mr. 
 
 234 Dickerson, supra note 2, at 636. 
 235 See supra page 23. Mr. Harrison was released from prison in 2004 after serving nearly 18 years for a 
rape he did not commit. Eight months after his release from prison, he was awarded $1 million through a bill 
passed by the Georgia legislature. See also Exonerees, GEORGIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www. 
georgiainnocenceproject.org/exonerees/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
 236 See Calvin Johnson, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3329. (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (Calvin Johnson, who served 16 
years, received $500,000); Douglas Echols, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich. 
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3199. (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (Douglas Echols, who 
served 5 years, received no compensation); Samuel Scott, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3623. (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) 
(Samuel Scott, who served 15 years, received no compensation). 
 237 See Albert Samaha, Exonerated and Out of Prison—And That’s Where the Trouble Starts, BUZZFEED 
NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertsamaha/exonerated-and-out-of-prison-and-thats-when-the-
trouble-star#.jrjlbqnzL. (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  
 243 Id. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 ultimately created the Wrongful 
Incarceration Exclusion, which does not include in income any civil damages, restitution, or other monetary 
award received that relates to wrongful conviction. See IRS, PATH Act Tax Related Provisions, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/path-act-tax-related-provisions (last visited Aug. 31, 2020); IRS, Wrongful 
Incarceration FAQs, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/wrongful-incarceration-faqs (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
While Mr. Harrison was eventually able to claim a refund, the initial payment undoubtedly contributed to his 
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Harrison’s financial distress stemmed from circumstances beyond his control, 
including a lack of financial literacy that he might have obtained had he not been 
wrongfully incarcerated. Had Mr. Harrison been provided a holistic reentry 
program, including a bankruptcy attorney, he would have been able to take 
control of his financial status before falling into financial distress. 
There is also the case of Theodore White, Jr., who was wrongfully convicted 
of sexually molesting his 12-year-old adopted daughter in Missouri in 1999.244 
He was exonerated six years later.245 In 2010, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a 2008 
judgment awarding $15 million to Mr. White.246 This judgment was the result 
of an action brought against the parties responsible for Mr. White’s 
exoneration.247 Despite this seemingly large award, Mr. White was not equipped 
to reenter the economy. In 2014, Mr. White filed a voluntary chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition following a record of financial difficulty.248 A large 
consideration for the bankruptcy court was that Mr. White did not file for 
bankruptcy until three years after his debt had begun accumulating.249 Mr. 
White’s case is an example of an exoneree’s bad experience in bankruptcy court. 
His property was repossessed, and his estate was liquidated. His interaction with 
the bankruptcy system was the result of a series of failed financial decisions. 
Had Mr. White been provided a bankruptcy attorney upon his exoneration, he 
would have reentered the society, and the economy, better equipped for success. 
A reentry program that includes access to bankruptcy attorneys would 
provide exonerees the opportunity to take a proactive approach to obtaining 
financial freedom following their release from prison. Ideally, this would help 
exonerees avoid financial distress and further involvement with the bankruptcy 
system later in life, when their debts have become larger and more complicated.  
 
financial distress. 
 244 Theodore White, Jr., THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3737 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).  
 245 Id. 
 246 In re White, 606 B.R. 908, 913 (Bankr. D. Utah 2019). 
 247 Id. 
 248 In re White, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 95, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 17, 2018). Mr. White faced many 
financial difficulties, including at least $328,714.68 in non-priority, undisputed, non-contingent, liquidated, 
unsecured debt that accumulated before 2011 and remained unpaid when he filed for bankruptcy in 2014; Mr. 
White also faced repossession of his home, a boat, and two cars. Id.  
 249 Id. at *3. 
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C. Implications 
Over the course of different Code amendments and enactments, chapter 13 
has elicited criticism.250 The criminal legal system has also elicited criticism, as 
the system has attempted to reconcile the trauma inflicted by wrongful 
incarceration. This Comment addresses three criticisms of the bankruptcy 
system and the criminal legal system. 
First, this Section discusses the criticism that the expansion of chapter 13 
discharge might lead to an incentivization of the debtor to accumulate debt. 
Second, this Section responds to the argument that adopting this proposal would 
lead to an overly sympathetic treatment of debtors and exonerees. It looks to 
criticisms of the scope of chapter 13 discharge, which suggest that the discharge 
has been expanded to include too many types of dischargeable debts and too 
many types of debtors. Third, and finally, this Section addresses the question of 
whether giving a discharge to exonerees is a slippery slope towards providing 
too much financial assistance to the wrongfully convicted. This Comment argues 
that discharging the debt of exonerees and their families would not validate any 
of these criticisms.  
1. Incentivizing the Accumulation of Debt 
One critique of chapter 13 discharge is that “discharge creates a moral hazard 
because it grants debtors the equivalent of free insolvency insurance, thereby 
incentivizing them to take on more debts and strategically employ the fresh start 
benefit.”251 But allowing exonerees expedited access to chapter 13 would not be 
incentivizing families and exonerees to accumulate debt during the period of 
wrongful incarceration. There is no guarantee that a wrongfully convicted 
person will be exonerated. In fact, there are plenty of posthumous exonerations, 
such as in the case of Timothy Cole, that reinforce the idea that no person can 
rely on the criminal legal system to free him from a wrongful conviction in his 
lifetime.252 Of course, many wrongfully convicted individuals are never 
exonerated.253 Thus, incarcerated individuals are not likely to accumulate debt 
with the expectation that it will be relieved through a bankruptcy discharge. For 
these reasons, bankruptcy courts should not fear furthering criticism of the 
bankruptcy system by discharging the debts of exonerees.  
 
 250 See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 224, at 2; Dickerson, supra note 2, at 629. 
 251 Elgueta, supra note 233, at 323 (citations omitted). 
 252 See Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 687 (2010). 
 253 See How Many Innocent People Are in Prison?, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/ 
how-many-innocent-people-are-in-prison/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). 
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2. Over-Inclusivity of Chapter 13 Discharge 
Some critics have focused on a debtor’s ability to discharge debt in chapter 
13 that would not be dischargeable in chapter 7, questioning if chapter 13 could 
act as a “haven” for the “dishonest debtor” who seeks discharge of debt 
stemming from criminal activity, such as criminal restitution.254 Yet 
exonerations are, by definition, “cases in which a person was wrongly convicted 
of a crime and later cleared of all the charges based on new evidence of 
innocence.”255 Further, “[a]bsent conviction of a crime, one is presumed 
innocent.”256 This Comment argues that exonerees and their families should be 
relieved of the debts that stemmed from wrongful conviction because the debts 
are not a result of criminal behavior by the incarcerated person. Instead, these 
debts are the result of the failure of the criminal legal system.  
Another criticism of chapter 13 suggests that the original goal of protecting 
the honest but unfortunate debtor has morphed to protect dishonest, over-
indebted debtors.257 As chapter 13 discharge has evolved,  
“a radical new reading of the expression ‘honest but unfortunate’ . . . 
now extends the concept of ‘misfortune’ to include all debtors who are 
unable to repay a debt, even when the debt originated as the result of 
a bad financial judgment, imprudence, or sometimes, a fraudulent 
act.”258 
But by discharging the debts of exonerees, the bankruptcy system would not be 
painting with too broad a brush with respect to what constitutes an unfortunate 
debtor. Exonerees suffer from one of the greatest misfortunes society can cause: 
the wrongful imprisonment of a person for crimes he did not commit. By 
allowing the discharge of debts that stemmed from wrongful incarceration, 
bankruptcy courts would not be making the discharge over-inclusive. Instead, 
bankruptcy courts would be allowing these honest but unfortunate debtors to 
obtain a fresh start.  
 
 254 See, e.g., Susan Jensen-Conklin, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 13: Fresh Start or Haven for 
Criminals, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 517 (1990); Ellen M. Horn, Good Faith and Chapter 13 Discharge: How Much 
Discretion is Too Much, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 657–58 (1990). 
 255 About the Registry, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
 256 Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1252 (2017). 
 257 Elgueta, supra note 233, at 315–16 (arguing that the “super discharge” of Chapter 13 “reveals the 
enormous divide between the original rationale of the policy . . . and the modern version.”). 
 258 Elgueta, supra note 233, at 316 (quoting Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral 
Undercurrents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 25 (2006)). 
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3. Slippery Slope of Aid to Exonerees 
Critics have also questioned how much aid to give exonerees and at what 
point this aid becomes unproductive for society as a whole. For instance, Justice 
Alito, concurring in the recent Supreme Court opinion in Nelson, raised the issue 
of extending refunds to all costs associated with wrongful conviction.259 He 
questioned, “if the status quo ante must be restored, why shouldn’t the defendant 
be compensated for all the adverse economic consequences of the wrongful 
conviction?”260 Justice Gorsuch also pointed out that costs associated with court 
fines and restitution will likely be “minor in comparison to the losses that result 
from conviction and imprisonment, such as attorney’s fees, lost income, and 
damage to reputation.”261 As noted by this Comment, those losses are, indeed, 
huge, and are arguably the most important to address.262 Not all of these losses 
can be addressed by the bankruptcy system; for example, the bankruptcy system 
cannot compensate an exoneree for harms due to lost earnings or damage to 
reputation. But it may provide an opportunity to extend restorative relief to 
exonerees by discharging the debt that stems from wrongful conviction.  
Society has not begun to relieve itself of the debt it owes the wrongfully 
convicted without providing meaningful and substantial relief to exonerees. 
“[F]reedom alone is not enough for the person who has been chewed up by the 
criminal legal system and then spit out as wrongfully convicted, lacking 
compensation for the harm suffered.”263 The majority opinion in Nelson wrote, 
“[j]ust as the restoration of liberty on reversal of a conviction is not 
compensation, neither is the return of money taken by the State on account of 
the conviction.”264 In doing so, the Court constructed the notion that refunding 
these fines and fees was a form of restoration, rather than compensation. If an 
exoneree sought discharge from debt that stemmed from his wrongful 
conviction, he would also be seeking restorative relief.  
CONCLUSION 
Wrongful conviction presents a paradoxical problem: society owes 
exonerees a debt for the injuries its criminal legal system has inflicted on them. 
 
 259 Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1260–61 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 See supra Section I.  
 263 John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-Property,” 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 515, 537 (2008). 
 264 Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257. 
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Yet exonerees often leave prison having accumulated debt. This Comment 
argues that the bankruptcy system could solve this problem by providing 
exonerees, quintessential “honest but unfortunate” people, relief through 
expedited chapter 13 discharge. Further, states should provide reentry programs 
that are specific to the issues exonerees face. These programs should provide 
holistic support, including representation by bankruptcy attorneys. The 
programs should not be capped monetarily but should instead guarantee the 
services that exonerees need to successfully reenter society.  
As the number of exonerations in the United States has increased, so has the 
need for systems that holistically support exonerees when they reenter society. 
The current compensation structure for the wrongfully convicted is insufficient 
and ineffective. Exonerees have lost years in which they could have been 
employed, and prison offers little opportunity to build experience to gain future, 
meaningful employment. To make matters worse, while exonerees are 
incarcerated, they and their families often go further into debt due to court fees 
and fines, long legal battles, and the inability to receive funds from the 
employment the exoneree could have had during his incarceration.  
The bankruptcy system and reentry programs share a common goal: 
providing a fresh start to those who have been deemed honest but have endured 
unfortunate circumstances. While both systems do not currently function 
effectively, these systems could work in tandem to improve. If reentry programs 
were supplemented with access to representation in bankruptcy courts, the 
bankruptcy system could help promote holistic and successful reentry for 
exonerees while reaffirming its commitment to rewarding honest but unfortunate 
debtors with discharge from debt. By relieving exonerees of the debt that 
stemmed from their wrongful incarceration, society will begin to repay the debt 
that is owed to the wrongfully convicted. 
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